Abstract-Cloud system peculiarities, such as enormous re sources and long-lasting accesses, introduce new security and management challenges. This paper presents an advanced autho rization framework based on the Usage Control (UCON) model and the OASIS XACML standard to regulate the usage of Cloud resources. Our framework addresses the issue of long lasting accesses and it is able to interrupt accesses that are in progress when the corresponding access rights do not hold any more. We provide the implementation of our framework and its integration with the OpenNebula toolkit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing popularity of Cloud systems [9] is due to the emerging suitability of virtualization technology for out sourcing the execution of heavy parts of business and research processes. The Cloud allows users to exploit the resources for their computation only when they actually need them, by paying a fee depending on the resources consumed. Usually, Cloud resources are long-standing instances exposed to end users through a proper interface. Virtual machines running in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Cloud are examples of virtualized resources. Cloud facilities are currently provided by many big companies (Public Clouds), such as Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft. Alternatively, a Cloud frame work, such as OpenNebula [10] , could be exploited to deploy Cloud systems in users' data centres, to use their physical machines to host virtual ones (P rivatelHybrid Clouds).
Besides the well-known threats of systems exposed on the Internet, the Cloud introduces new security and management challenges due to its specific peculiarities, such as enormous resources available to end-users and long lasting accesses. This paper proposes an enhanced authorization system for Cloud systems that deals with long lasting accesses, and it is able to interrupt accesses that are in progress when the corresponding access rights do not hold any more.
Our approach is based on the Usage Control (UCON) model, defined by Sandhu and Park in [15] . The idea to exploit the UCON model for security and management of Cloud resources was given in [5] . In recent years UCON has drawn a significant interest from the research community on formalization and enforcement of policies. There were several attempts to implement usage control as well while the realization based on existing security standards is still an open issue. An efficient and flexible framework (i.e., a policy schema, an architecture and an implementation) for access and usage control based on the OASIS XACML [13] standard is a challenge we address in our work. We integrated our framework with OpenNebula and executed some performance tests.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II gives basic notes on usage control and a running policy example. Sec tion III describes architecture and workflow of the prototype. Section IV presents the implementation of the prototype. Section V summarizes related work. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. USAGE CONTROL
The UCON model [15] introduces new features in the decision process w. r.t. traditional Access Control models, such as the mutable attributes of subjects, objects, and environment, and the continuity of policy enforcement to guarantee that the right of a subject to use the resource holds while the access is in progress.
This model can be successfully adopted in case of long standing accesses because the decision process consists of two phases. The pre decision phase corresponds to traditional access control, where the decision process is performed at the request time to produce the access decision. The ongoing de cision phase, instead, is executed after the access is started and implements the continuity of control that is a specific feature of the UCON. Continuous control implies that policies are re evaluated each time mutable attributes change their values. The UCON decision process evaluates authorizations (predicates over subject's and object's attributes), conditions (predicates over environmental attributes), and obligations (actions that must be performed along with the access). If the decision process recognizes the policy violation, the access is revoked and resources are released. Also, the requester can end the access on hislher discretion. Fig. 1 shows the U-XACML policy language [2] obtained extending the XACML with constructs for usage control. To represent continuous control, the U-XACML specifies when the access decision must be taken through the clause DecisionTime in the <Condition> elements (the ad mitted values are pre and on denoting, respectively, pre and ongoing decisions), and the TriggerOn clause in the <Obligation> elements. To represent attribute updates, it defines a new element, <AttrUpdates>, that contains a collection of single <AttrUpdate> elements to specify update actions. The time of update is stated by the element UpdateTime that has values of pre, on and post. For further details on the U-XACML language, we refer to [2] .
A. U-XACML Approach

B. Running Policy Example
We consider the following security policies expressed in natural language which govern the execution of virtual ma chines (VMs) in the Cloud system and include both traditional access control and usage control statements:
• Access control authorizations: A regular user is allowed to start only VMs he/she created. If permitted, the user's attribute num-vm-running (the number of VMs running on the user's behalf) is increased;
• Usage control authorizations: If num-vm-running exceeds 5, then the system terminates the VM which started first, i.e., the VM with the earliest value of the vm-stime attribute;
• Usage control post updates: Either the VM was terminated as the result of the policy violation or it ended normally, num-vm-running must be decreased.
III. PROTOTYPE
This section presents the architecture and the workflow of our authorization system prototype supporting the enforcement of U-XACML policies in Cloud.
A. Architecture ): is integrated within the components of the Cloud system, e.g., OpenNebula, that executes the security relevant actions that are regulated by the security policy. An important feature of the PEP is that it must be non-bypassable, tamper-proof, and it must:
• intercept the invocation and suspend the execution of the security relevant actions; 2) Policy Information Point (PIP): provides an interface for retrieving mutable attributes needed by the UCON autho rization system to produce access decisions. The PIP contacts Attribute Managers (AMs) to obtain the required attributes. The AMs are attribute repositories which provide facilities for storing attributes, keeping updated, etc.
3) Context Handler (CH): is the front-end of the UCON authorization system, that manages the protocol for communi cating with PEPs and PIPs. It converts and forwards messages sent between components in the proper format. During the pre decision phase, the CH also contacts the PIP and retrieves security attributes.
4)
Policy Administration Point (PAP): stores and manages U-XACML policies.
5)
Policy Decision Point (U-PDP): evaluates U-XACML policies to produce access decisions for access requests. onevm shutdown 
6) Access
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Manager The SM also manages the ongoing decision phase. It performs the periodical retrieval of mutable attributes. If two usage sessions refer to the same mutable attributes, the SM queries those attributes just once instead of sending two disjoint queries. Attribute queries are unique for all sessions. This decreases a security overhead posed by concurrent usage sessions. When the values of some attributes change, it triggers the access re-evaluation of all usage sessions that exploit these attributes. Each session, where a decision turns to "deny" must be revoked. The SM repeats the attribute retrieval until there is atleast one active session.
If the AM supports a subscription, the SM performs the subscription for relevant attributes through the PIP. Instead, for AMs that do not support a subscription, the SM repeatedly queries the AM through the PIP for detecting changes in attribute values. The time interval between two consecutive queries is a configuration parameter and is set according to the attribute to be monitored. There are also some attributes which are updated as the result of the policy enforcement. These attributes do not require to be retrieved and the SM stores and updates them directly in the AT.
B. Workflow
Due to space limitation, we present the message workflow only in the case of a session revocation due to a policy violation (see Fig. 3 ). The normal end of access has a simpler workflow and we omitted it here.
The first message, tryaccess, is sent by the PEP to the CH when the request for the execution of a security relevant action is intercepted by the PEP on the Cloud system. The CH retrieves the values of the attributes that could be relevant to the decision process by sending the attr query message to the PIP that, in turn, contacts the relevant AMs exploiting their specific protocols, and sends back these values to the CH through the message attr value. The CH then sends the access request that includes the attributes previously collected, to the V-PDP. The V-PDP loads the V-XACML policy from the PAP. The V-PDP evaluates the policy and replies with the response to the CH.
978-1-908320-08/7/$25.00©2012 IEEE Let us suppose that the policy allows the execution of the requested action: then the CH replies with the permitaccess message to the PEP. Before sending it, the CH sends the create entry message to the SM for creating a new entry that represents the new usage session in the AT. Also, the create entry message contains attribute updates which should be performed by the SM before the usage session starts.
When the access has began (e.g., the VM is running), the PEP sends the startaccess message to the CH, that sends the message update entry to the SM. The SM contacts the AT to change the status field of the database entry related to this usage session from pending to active, and triggers the evaluation of the ongoing access for the first time. Hence, the SM starts the continuous policy re-evaluation loop and sends the attr query message to the PIP to get the fresh values of attributes that are relevant for this access. The PIP gets these values from the AMs, and sends them back to the SM. If one of the collected values is different from the one cached in the AT, the SM contacts the CH sending the policy reevaluation message; the CH translates it in the right format and sends the request message to the V-PDP that performs the re-evaluation of the access right. If the decision included in the response message is permit, then the CH forwards this answer to the SM. The SM performs ongoing attribute updates contained in the V-PDP's reply and continues the policy enforcement by collecting fresh attributes and triggering the access re-evaluation. Instead, if the response included in the response message sent by the V-PDP is deny, the SM sends the revokeaccess message including the data to identify the right PEP to the CH that forwards it to this PEP that will force the access revocation, e.g., by shutting down the running VM.
IV. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the implementation of the proposed VCON authorization system and its integration with the Open Nebula (ONE), a widespread framework for management of Cloud resources (see Fig. 4) .
A. UCON Integration with OpenNebula
The native authorization support of the ONE consists of ACLs and usage quotas. ACLs regulate the access to Cloud resources based on the user's id and role, while the usage quotas regulate how many resources the user can consume, e.g., the number of VMs, the storage space, etc. Access rights are evaluated only once before letting a VM or other resource to be created and launched. Thus, the native support provides access control only, and it is not powerful enough to manage the usage of resources when the access is in progress.
1) UCON Actions in OpenNebula:
We chose the execution of a VM as an example of a long-standing action and the enforcement of the UCON policy given in Section II-B as a case-study. Table I shows the correspondence between the ONE actions invoked to run the VM and the UCON messages. The first column specifies a command sent to the ONE gateway in order to manage a VM instance. The ONE Core intercepts this command and sends the proper access request to the Authorization Driver (AD) for the security check, i.e., the second column. The third column defines the state of the VM instance before and after the execution of the user's command. The last column specifies the corresponding UCON message.
The tryaccess message is sent to the external UCON autho rization system when a user invokes the onevm deploy through the ONE interface (e.g., the command line interface (CLI», the ONE Core intercepts it and sends the MANAGE request to the AD, and the state of the requested VM is PENDING. The permitaccess message means that the AD grants the access while the denyaccess states the opposite. When the ONE VM Driver executes the deploy command, the VM's state changes from PEND1NG to RUNNING, and this corresponds to the startaccess. If the security policy is violated during the VM execution, the revokeaccess message is sent by the UCON authorization system to stop the VM execution. This equals to the invocation of the onevm shutdown command by the admin user and leads to the change of the VM's state from RUNNING to SHUTDOWN. Notice, commands of the admin user are allowed by the AD. If the user decides to stop the running VM, he/she sends any of onevm shutdownlcancellstoplsuspend commands. These commands are always permitted and cause the endaccess message to be sent.
2) Mutable Attributes:
The security policy given in Sec tion II-B is based on the following mutable attributes: the num vm-running attribute of the user and the vm-stime attribute of the VM. These attributes are kept in the ONE Database and the ONE Core manages them. Thus, the implementation of the AM is straightforward because it simply consists in an invocation to the ONE Cloud Java API to retrieve these attributes.
3) PEP Implementation: The PEP code has been embedded in several components of the ONE. In particular, the AD 978-1-908320-08/7/$25.00©2012 IEEE is responsible for sending the trylendaccess messages and enforcing the permitldenyaccess messages, the Hook Manager (HM) is in charge of sending the startaccess message, and the ONE's admin user enforces the revokeaccess.
When the user issues the onevm deploy command, the ONE Core intercepts and suspends it and calls the AD for the access decision. We configured the ONE to exploit our implementation of the AD, a plug-in written in Ruby. The AD receives the user id (user-id), the VM id (vm-id), and the command to be executed (MANAGE).
Next, the AD gets from the ONE Database the state of the requested VM. If the state is PENDING, then the AD recognizes that the user tries to start the VM (see Table I ) and sends the tryaccess message to the UCON authorization system. This message is encoded as XACML Request and embedded in SAML Assertion in accordance with the "SAML 2.0 profile of XACML" [l3]. The AD sends the message over HTTP /SOAP transport and waits for the reply. The UCON authorization system replies with the access decision. The AD processes the response and replies with SUCCESS to the ONE Core if the permitaccess was received. Otherwise, the AD triggers the authorization exception.
The ONE Core needs some time to start the VM. When the VM has been started its state changes to RUNNING and this event triggers the HM, a custom Ruby script. We implemented the HM which sends the startaccess message to the UCON authorization system. This message is placed inside the SAML Assertion and along with it we insert the vm-id, the user-id, and the vm-stime attributes.
If the security policies always hold during the access, then the user is an entity that decides when to stop the VM. The user sends this request to the ONE Core which forwards it to the AD. The AD allows the request and additionally forwards it to the UCON authorization system. The endaccess is sent similarly to the tryaccess. If the security policies do not hold, then the UCON authorization system initiates the access revocation by sending the onevm shutdown command to the ONE Core. This request is forwarded to the AD and it is authorized because the AD recognises that the UCON authorization system is the originator of the request.
B. UCON Authorization System as a Service
The UCON authorization system is a web service based implementation of the architecture given in Fig. 2 . We exploit two web-services: the PIP service which implements the func tionality of the PIP, and the Authorization Service (AS) which implements the rest. We used the Apache Axis2 framework (http://axis.apache.org/axis2) to implement and deploy these services.
1) Implementation of Authorization Service:
The opera tions that can be performed by the AS corresponds to the tryaccess, startaccess, and endaccess. The Message Exchange Pattern for the tryaccess is In-Out, and In-Only for other operations. The CH processes incoming and outgoing mes sages, i.e., access requests and responses, attribute queries. These messages are compliant with the "SAML 2.0 profile of XACML". For the CH implementation we used Open SAML2.0 extension library (http://www.bccs.uib.no/�hakont/ SAMLXACMLExtension).
<PolicySet PolicyCombiningAlgld="deny-override"> <Target> ... <Match Matchld="anyURI-equal"> <AttributeValue>run-vm</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator Attributeld="action:action-id"/> <!Match> ... <!Target> <!--permit part --!> <Policy RuleCombiningAlgld="permit-override" > <Rule Effect="Permit"/> <ObligationExpressions> <ObligationExpression Obligationld="re-evaluate" FulfillOn="permit"/> </ObligationExpressions> <!Policy> <!--deny part --!> <Policy RuleCombiningAlgld="deny-override" ... > <Rule Effect="Deny" ... ><Condition> <Apply Functionld=lIand"> <Apply Functionld="integer-greater-then"> <AttributeValue>5<!AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator Attributeld="num-vm-running"/> <!Apply> <Apply Functionld="all-of"> <Apply Functionld="time-less-then"> <AttributeDesignator Attributeld="this-vm-stime"/> <Apply Functionld="time-bag"> <AttributeDesignator Attributeld="vm-stime"/> <!Apply><!Apply><!Apply><!Apply><!Condition><!Rule> <ObligationExpressions> <ObligationExpression Obligationld="attrUpdate" FulfillOn="deny"> <AttributeAssigmentExpression> <AttributeValue>"num-vm-running" -l</AttirubteValue> <!AttributeAssigmentExpression> <AttributeAssigmentExpression> <AttributeDesignator Attributeld="subject-id"/> </AttributeAssigmentExpression></ObligationExpression> <!Policy><!PolicySet> Figure 5 . On Policy in XACML syntax Fig. 4 shows the U-PDP implementation based on the XACML PDP and the Policy Splitter (PS). The PS takes as input a U-XACML policy and a parameter assigned to pre, on, or end, and generates XACML policies that encode the corresponding logic. The pre policies are evaluated only once before the access starts and correspond to the pre decision phase. The on policies are enforced repeatedly while the access is in progress. They also include attribute updates and obligations that must be done in the case of the access revocation. Updates and obligation is the case of the normal end of access are stated in the end policies which are evaluated only once when the endaccess is received. The on and end policies correspond to the on decision phase. Due to the space limitation, it will be shown elsewhere how a basic U-XACML policy can be split in distinct XACML policies w.r.t. pre, on, and end. Fig. 5 shows the example of the on policy for our case-study. The splitting gives us the opportunity to exploit existing XACML engines. We used the Sun's XACML Engine (http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net).
New instances of CH, U-PDP, and PS are created per every request, while there is only one instance of the SM for all concurrent sessions. The SM is started by the CH when the U-PDP of the first usage session responses with the permit after evaluation of the tryaccess. The SM dies when the last usage session ends or it should be revoked. The SM keeps infonnation regarding sessions in the AT implemented as the MySQL Database. The implementation of the long-standing AS with the attributes shared among the concurrent sessions was possible due to the support of the state-full web services in the Axis2 framework.
978-1-908320-08/7/$25.00©2012 IEEE 2) PIP Implementation: The PIP was implemented as a stateless web service. It receives SAMLAttributeQueries and responses with SAMLAttributeStatements. In the current im plementation we do not support the subscription mechanism, thus the SM initiates the pulling of fresh attributes from the PIP. For our case-study, the SM can manage mutable attributes and triggers the access re-evaluation independently from the PIP. In fact, the vm-stime attributes are sent by the ONE Core along with the startaccess, and the num-vm-running are updated by the policy and thus can be managed solely by the SM and stored in the AT.
C. Peiformance Evaluation
This section presents the performance tests we performed on our prototype. The ONE frontend and the AS were hosted in a virtual machine with Ubuntu 10.04 and Java 1.6 support and the VM has 1 CP U (the native machine has Intel Xeon Processor W3565, 3.20 GHz) and 4 GB memory. The overhead due to the pre-authorization phase is the sum of the following time intervals: tpepOut, tattT, tpdp, tpepln.
The time tpepOut is needed to build the SAMLIXACML authorization request by the PEP and to send it to the AS. We measured that lOms in average passed from the point when the access request is going to be created until the request is received by the AS.
The time tattT is needed to process the access request by the AS, to build a SAML Attribute Query, to retrieve fresh attributes from PIP, to construct the final XACML request combining the access request and the attributes received from the PIP. The 1st and 2nd rows of Table II show how tattT depends on the number of attributes carried by the PIP. There is a slight growth of tattT with the number of attributes. Please, notice that in our tests the attributes were stored in a file, while in real systems an external AM could be adopted and tattT could be higher. Although, we received that the attribute retrieval contributes the most in the overhead.
TABLE II OVERHEAD OF ATTRIBUTE RETRIEVAL AND DECISION MAKING
The time tpdp is needed to evaluate an XACML request against the U-XACML policy and get an XACML response. The 1st and 3d rows of Table II show how tpdp depends on the number of attributes in the policy. There is a linear growth of tpdp with the number of attributes.
tpepln specifies time passed from the point when the AS is going to send the SAMLIXACML response until the PEP is ready to enforce the access decision. We evaluated that tpepln is about 6ms in average if there are no post-updates and obligations that should be enforced along with the decision.
The security checks that implement the continuous control, instead, do not directly affect the performance of the resource usage. In fact, the AS could run on another machine rather than on the same machine that executes the access. The AS is responsible for a continuous attribute retrieval and a policy re-evaluation therefore tattT and tpdp contribute mainly to the AS workload. The AS idles between policy checks. The overall number of active usage sessions, which the AS can manage, depends on whether sessions can synchronize on the attribute retrieval. In fact, if all sessions share the same attributes, this number could be very high since the SM runs a single query to collect the attributes. Only the access re-evaluation is the time consuming operation in this scenario. When the AS determines that a particular session should be revoked the time needed to deliver this information to the PEP is in range of tpepln' Hence, tpepln is the inevitable delay of the access revocation.
V. RELATED WORK
In our previous work we studied how to extend XACML to enforce UCON policies [2] and provided a pilot imple mentation [8] . In this paper we address the management of concurrent usage sessions and provide an integration with the ONE. Our performance tests shown a promising results in comparison with existing evaluation of XACML engines [6] .
Gouglidis et al. [5] survey access control requirements for Cloud and Grid computing. Authors consider the UCON model as the best candidate to address these requirements. Danwei et al. [3] and Tavizi et al. [11] refine this idea and propose the architecture for the enforcement of UCON policies. Danwei et al. [3] concern mostly the pre-authorization phase and privacy of security attributes. Authors handle the privacy issues by integrating their model with trust negotiations. The paper is a very high-level and authors do not provide details on the continuous control. The implementation of the model is missing too. Tavizi et al. [11] focus mostly on the obligation enforcement. Authors argue as we do that XACML should be extended to express UCON policies. But authors do not provide details on how the XACML policy extended by them can be enforced. Also, authors do not address the management of concurrent usage sessions. Finally, it is not clear which Cloud systems can exploit their model.
Recently, the UCON model was successfully adopted in other distributed systems related to Cloud, e.g., Grid [1] , [14] . Sandhu et al. [14] consider what parts of UCON can be modelled in XACML. In contrast, our approach consider how XACML should be extended to capture continuous control. Also, they imply that attribute providers trigger the access re evaluation while we argue that active AS should also be in place, i.e. the SM decides in our prototype when to retrieve attributes. In fact, selection of a time interval between adjacent attribute queries is an open issue and there are several ideas on this topic [7] , [4] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper is in the forefront of an authorization framework for Cloud system based on the UCON model, that is able to deal with long lasting accesses, avoiding that users continue the usage of previously assigned resources when the access rights are not valid any more. A prototype of the authorization system was developed and integrated in the OpenNebula to show the effectiveness of the proposed solution. We are currently working on improving the prototype with respect to the security issues and management of other long lasting Cloud resources and services.
